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FACTLESS JURISPRUDENCE*

by Darren Lenard Hutchinson**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Terry Smith has written a very important work on the
inadequacy of juridical approaches to antidiscrimination law in the context of
Title VII litigation.' Smith argues that the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII
can serve more broadly as a mechanism for protecting workers of color from
prohibited racial discrimination.2 Smith contends that contemporary equality
jurisprudence, however, impedes the protective scope of the anti-retaliation
provision because courts fail to appreciate the broader context of racial antagonism in which persons of color live.3 Particularly, courts often misinterpret
lawful racial protest in the workplace as disruptive and appropriately regulated
to the detriment of the protesting employee. Yet, as Smith's research uncovers,
racial protest typically occurs as a reaction to subtle (and explicit) discrimination against persons of color in the workplace.4 Citing to interdisciplinary
works, particularly medical research, Smith argues that confronting acts of
racism improves the physical and emotional well-being of blacks, who suffer
negative health consequences when they stifle their reactions to racial antag*
I borrow this term from Judith Resnik, who has utilized it to describe the
decontexualized "civil rights" and federalism jurisprudence of the William H. Rehnquist
Court. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, CategoricalFederalism: Jurisdiction,Gender, and the Globe,
111 Yale L.J. 619, 624 (2001) ("Demanding factful, rather than 'factless,' discussions could
help tether judges to records and statutes, thereby cabining the reach of their decisions.").

**
Visiting Associate Professor, Washington College of Law, American University;
Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University Law School. I am grateful to Dean
Claudio Grossman who provided the summer research grant that funded the production of this
paper. Natalie Koss provided excellent research assistance.

I.
Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII,
34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 529 (2003).
2.

Id. at 530-31.

3.

Id. at 535-36.

4.

Id. at 546-47.

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW

[34:615

onism. 5 By linking racial protest to worker health, 6 Smith hopes to provide a
richer context for juridical analyses of Title VII anti-retaliation litigation, a
context that could lead to more antiracist applications of antidiscrimination law.
Smith's work makes a critical contribution to legal discourse on the
problem of inequality and the limitations of traditional juridical approaches to
subordination. While his paper offers a sophisticated and compelling reading of
doctrinal failings in this area of law, I want to push his analysis further on three
particular points that his work implicates, but which could use more theorizing.
First, Smith's article implicates the social or "expressive" nature of
identity categories and the current failure of courts to grapple with "expressive
identity." Rather than viewing identity categories as closely linked to speech
and expression, courts treat identity as separate from the necessary speech and
conduct that sustain its existence.
Second (and related to the first point), Smith's article illuminates a
broader problem in contemporary civil rights jurisprudence-the failure of
courts to contextualize their decisions in historical, social, and economic
realities (including the reality of expressive identity). Courts often permit racial
and other forms of discrimination to escape judicial invalidation because their
understanding of race is ahistorical: they do not recognize the subtle mechanisms of discrimination in a society that demands formal equality. While
Smith's article addresses this problem in the narrow confines of Title VII
jurisprudence, he could enhance his jurisprudential model for understanding the
anti-retaliation provisions by analyzing the pervasive and comprehensive nature
of decontextualized juridical analysis.
Finally, Smith's work should remind readers of the vulnerability of
oppressed classes in civil rights litigation. As I argue more thoroughly in a
forthcoming work, in the context of equal protection jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has "inverted" the concepts of privilege and subordination. The
Court provides its most heightened level of protection to historically advantaged
groups and to members of dominant classes, particularly whites, who challenge
remedial legislation or governmental policies designed to alleviate the material
consequences of discrimination. At the same time, the Court denies a careful
application of civil rights laws in cases involving claims of discrimination by
persons of color. 7 In the context of Title VII, as Smith's article illuminates,
5.
Id. at 547-48.
6.
Id.
7.
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race: The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence,2003 U. Ill. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 24, on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law
Review).
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courts often fail to ground their analyses on the histories of victims of racial discrimination and instead apply a white normative model, which effectively
protects acts of white supremacy in the workplace against the efforts of persons
of color to counter such indignities through their own protests and in the
litigation process. Consequently, courts have effectively favored white supremacy over racial protest; they have inverted the legislative purposes of Title VII.
Critical theorists do not treat judicial marginalization of persons of color as
merely accidental; rather, they see courts as having a central role in sustaining
social hierarchy. 8 The indeterminate nature of law and legal analysis, moreover,
heightens the vulnerability of oppressed classes in equality jurisprudence. 9
Despite the perceived gains engendered by a rights approach to justice, the
malleable nature of law has meant that legal structures may not adequately
secure the interests of oppressed classes.

8.
Critical Race theorists, for example, have argued that "neutral" legal doctrines, like
colorblindness, reinforce social hierarchy. See, e.g, Richard Delgado, Review Essay,
Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 Stan. L.

Rev. 1133, 1152-53 (1993) ("Facially neutral laws cannot redress most racism, because of the
cultural background against which such laws operate. But even if we could somehow control
for this, formally neutral rules would still fail to redress racism because of certain structural
features of the phenomenon itself.") (internal quotations omitted); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was
Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory

Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1993) (examining the impact upon the doctrine of the
"transparency phenomenon" or the "tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about
norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific"); Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of

Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1052-56, 1102-18 (1978) (arguing that the
Court has embraced a "perpetrator perspective" in its antidiscrimination jurisprudence because
it fails to examine critically the negative effects of "neutral" laws upon the victims of
oppression); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 Stan. L. Rev.

1 (1991) (examining how color-blind constitutionalism legitimates racial inequality and
domination); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination,39 How. L.J. 1, 72

(1995) (arguing that the "diversion of resources from racial minorities to whites [effectuated
by color-blind jurisprudence] is good, old-fashioned racial discrimination, pure and simple").
9.
See, e.g., John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From CriticalLegal Studies Forwardto
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 Duke L.J.

84, 89 (1995) (arguing that the legal realist indeterminacy thesis "implied that the rules of law
could not constrain judges' choices since it was the judges who chose which rules to apply
and how to apply them" and that "since such choices were necessarily based on the judges'
beliefs about what was right, it was the judges' personal value judgments that consciously or
unconsciously formed the basis of their decisions").
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EXPRESSIVE IDENTITY AND ANTIRACIST SPEECH

Smith argues that racial protest is central to the health of persons of
color. 10 Drawing upon psychological and medical research, Smith contends that
when blacks confront, rather than absorb, racial indignities, they reduce the
level of injury from racism. Smith thus portrays racial protest speech as a form
of survival for black workers. As such, racial protest stands as a necessary-or
at least very important-part of racial experience for persons of color. Courts,
however, often fail to link antiracist expression to racial well-being. Instead,
they often favor employers in situations where workers employ dramatic
measures to bring attention to the problem of workplace racial antagonism.
While Smith's paper should elucidate the boundaries, even if tentative, of
appropriate worker protest, I want to focus on a more central and important
dimension of judicial marginalization of antiracist protest: the way in which
these decisions bifurcate identity and expression.
While Title VII protects employees from race and sex discrimination,
substantial misunderstanding exists as to the definition and scope of these
categories of identity. Traditional approaches to race and sex discrimination
treat these categories as biologically imposed; under the traditional analysis,
race is determined by skin color and other morphological features, while sex is
rooted in bipolar biological demarcation. A rich body of contemporary
literature, however, has debunked traditional understandings of race, sex, and
other forms of identity; rather than existing in biology, identity is "socially
constructed" and determined by human interaction." The anti-retaliation
provisions of Title VII actually link expression and identity by providing a
cause of action for employees who suffer a negative employment action due to
their good faith expression of antiracism. 12 The juridical articulation of Section
704, nevertheless, places identity and speech in conflict when courts fail to treat

10.

Smith, supra note 1, at 545-52.

11.
See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 2
(1990) (arguing that gender is socially constructed); Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial
Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s, at 55 (2d ed. 1986) ("The effort
must be made to understand race as an unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings
constantly being transformed by political struggle."); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and
the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503,
503-68 (1994) (criticizing biological essentialism in sexual identity theory); Ian F. Haney
L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,and
Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1994) ("Race must be viewed as a social
construction. That is, human interaction rather than natural differentiation must be seen as the
source and continued basis for racial categorization.").
12.

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
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employee antiracist protests as legitimate expressions protected by the statute.
As Smith argues, an obvious route to this decontextualized approach occurs
when courts place high burdens upon protesting employees to demonstrate that
they had a reasonable basis to conclude that their employers were engaging in
racial discrimination. 13 The courts' failure to appreciate the subtle or hidden
nature of contemporary discrimination makes them skeptical of plaintiffs' perceived need to engage in antiracist protest.
A second dimension of the jurisprudence in this area more vividly
illustrates the false speech-equality dichotomy. As Smith argues, courts have
required plaintiffs not only to prove that they engaged in racial protest after
reasonably concluding that their employer was discriminating on the basis of
race, but that their responsive protest itself was reasonable.14 The doctrine thus
employs a "disruptiveness" test under which some courts have sought to
balance employees' statutory right to engage in antiracist protest against the
employers' "need" to "control" their personnel. The balancing test recognizes,
as mandated by Section 704, some connection between speech and equality.
Courts, however, have limited the potential reach of the statute and obscured the
relationship between speech and identity by failing to consider how the level
and nature of employee protest might relate to, and sustain the racial identity of,
persons of color. The balancing formula obfuscates the relationship between
speech and identity when it neglects to consider, as Smith reveals, that the
"reasonableness of [employee] opposition may be informed by the racial,
gender, or other status of the complainant."'' 5 In attempting to carve out a space
for "employer control," courts have distanced expression from the identity
categories that form the basis for protection under the statute itself.
The juridical distancing of speech from expression occurs outside of
Section 704 litigation, and many critical scholars have revealed how antidiscrimination doctrine typically bifurcates expression and identity, thereby
deploying an inadequate and decontextualized theory of equality. 16 In Section
13.
14.
15.

Smith, supra note 1, at 552.
Id.at 560-A.
Id.at 562-63.

16.
See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of
Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 769, 839 (1987) (arguing that
"[i]ndividuals... conceive their special identities through a wide amalgam of acts" and that
"we must criticize the cavalier fashion with which courts dismiss individuals' claims that
employers' racially, sexually, or ethnically premised rules unjustly restrict personal integrity
and expression"); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365, 366-67, 371-81 (criticizing courts for not treating
employers' regulation of black women's physical appearance in the workplace as a form of
racial, gender, and cultural domination); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia
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703 litigation, for example, courts have legitimated a host of employer
"controls," such as "English-only"' 17 rules and grooming' 8 requirements that
operate to the detriment of persons of color. In these decisions, courts have
treated race as if it exists separately and apart from open manifestations of that
identity. 19
Constitutional jurisprudence provides further evidence of courts'
clinical or sterile treatment of identity. In Hernandez v. New York, 2° for
example, the Supreme Court validated a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to strike all Spanish-speakers from the jury, which resulted in the
exclusion of all Latino and Latina persons from a jury in the trial of a Latino
defendant. 2' Despite the immediate racial impact of the peremptory challenges
and the cultural and historical linkages between Spanish language and Latino
and Latina identity-and white supremacist treatment of Latinos and Latinasthe Court would not accept the defendant's argument that the exclusionary
pattern reflected racial bias. 2 Under the Court's analysis, Spanish language is
23
distinct from race.

Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understandingthe Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal
Indeterminacy, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1347, 1367-72 (1997) (arguing that courts such as the Fifth
Circuit in Garciav. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) fail to treat employers' Spanish
language discrimination as a manifestation of national origin discrimination because they do
not appreciate the centrality of Spanish language in constructing Latino/a identity); Angela P.
Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 Cal.
L. Rev. 1923, 2008 (2000) (arguing that the doctrinal treatment of "race as an immutable trait
means that merely 'cultural' behaviors and practices do not receive legal protection unless
they can be strongly linked back to the 'immutable' characteristics of race or national origin"
and that "[t]he separation of 'race' from 'culture' . . . gives employers and government
agencies broad room to force employees marked as racially 'other' to assimilate to a socially
'white' standard").
See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 16, at 1361-67 (discussing judicial rulings
17.
sustaining employer "English-only" rules over Title VII challenges).
See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 16, at 371-81 (criticizing failure of courts to
18.
recognize racially discriminatory nature of employer grooming rules).
See Harris, supra note 16 (criticizing judicial bifurcation of race and cultural
19.
practice).
20.

500 U.S. 352 (1991).

21.

Id.

22.
Id. at 364-70 (accepting trial court's determination that exclusion of Latino/a jurors
was based on their "bilingual," rather than racial, status).
Id. at 364-72. For a critique of this decision that reveals the connections between
23.
Latino/a status, language, and race, see Juan Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts,
Prosecutors,and the Fearof Spanish, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1992).
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The judicial bifurcation of identity and speech occurs in contexts
outside of race. In recent decisions, for example, the Supreme Court has
exhibited a persistent refusal to recognize the expressive nature of identity in
the context of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender equality claims. 2 4 In
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,25 the
Court held that application of a state public accommodations statute so as to
require the admission of a gay and lesbian unit in Boston's Saint Patrick's Day
Parade (over the objection of parade organizers) would violate the First
Amendment rights of parade organizers by "compelling" them to speak.26 The
Court held that the parade itself and participation in the parade constituted
forms of expression and that the forced inclusion of the unwanted group within
the parade would alter the content of the organizers' speech; the parade
organizers had a constitutional right to control the nature of their own speech.27
While this limited conclusion might have justified the decision, the Court
attempts to separate the parade organizers' discriminatory treatment of the gay
and lesbian parade unit from "pure" anti-gay discrimination.28 In so doing, the
Court artificially distances gay and lesbian self-identification from gay and
lesbian status. For instance, the Court explained that the organizers'
discrimination pertained only to speech, rather than to identity:
Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and
no individual member of [the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston (GLIB)] claims to have been excluded from parading as a
member of any group that the Council has approved to march.
Instead, the disagreement goes to the
admission of GLIB as its own
29
parade unit carrying its own banner.

24.

I have examined this matter elsewhere. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson,

Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. Pa. J.

Const. L. 85, 115-25 (1998) (arguing that courts have not yet included outness in civil rights
jurisprudence) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness]; Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
"Closet Case": Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 81, 106-20 (2001) (arguing that
Court's budding sexual orientation jurisprudence fails to link "outness" with gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender identity) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Closet Case].

25.

515 U.S. 557 (1995).

26.
Id. at 572-81.
27.
Id. at 568-78.
28.
Id. at 572 (holding that the parade organizers did not desire to discriminate against
"homosexuals as such" but only to exclude the group from marching as a "parade unit
carrying its own banner") (emphasis added).
29.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The Court blurs the expressive nature of identity in its attempt to make a
distinction between gays and 30lesbians "as such" and gays and lesbians who
"flaunt" their sexual identities.
The Court reached a similar-yet even more problematic--decision in
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.3 1 The Court ruled that application of a New
Jersey public accommodations statute to force the inclusion of an openly gay
assistant scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts of America would violate the
organization's right of expressive association.32 As I argued in a prior work, the
Court's treatment of gay and lesbian identity and expression in Dale follows a
traditional model that sees expression and identity as unconnected.33 The Court
held that the Boy Scouts could not simply point to Dale's "mere" status as a
"member" of the class of gays and lesbians to justify his exclusion.34 The Court,
however, concludes that the Boy Scouts did not engage in pure status-based
discrimination. Instead, the organization justifiably excluded Dale on the basis
of his gay-related expression and association.35 To distinguish the Boy Scouts'
discrimination from pure status-based exclusion, the Court points to Dale's
expression; the Court finds that "Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group
of gay Scouts who have 'become leaders in their community and are open and
honest about their sexual orientation."' 36 Furthermore, the Court discusses
Dale's participation in gay and lesbian politics and social support groups,
including the fact that he "was the copresident of a gay and lesbian organization
at college and remains a gay rights activist." 37 The Court singles out Dale's gay
self-identification in order to illustrate that the Boy Scouts's anti-gay
discrimination relates to speech, rather than status. The Court afforded the Boy
Scouts, like employers in the Title VII context, a broad ability to control speech
among its members; yet, the organization did not, according to the Court's
analysis, engage in status-based discrimination.

See Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness, supra note 24, at 103-04 (arguing that,
30.
in Hurley, the Court "implied that discrimination against non-heterosexuals is permissible if it
only targets openness--or the placing of sexuality on a 'banner"').
31.

530 U.S. 640 (2000).

32.

Id. at 655-56.

33.

See Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 24, at 106-20.

34.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (holding that "an expressive association can[not] erect a
shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member
from a particular group would impair its message").
35.

Id. at 653 (discussing Dale's expression and distinguishing it from his gay status).

36.

Id.

37.

Id.
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The foregoing constitutional and statutory civil rights cases illustrate a
common problem in antidiscrimination jurisprudence-the inability of courts to
imagine identity as expressive, rather than as clinical and biological. Professor
Smith's analysis of the judicial failure to contextualize antiracist protest speech
within the context of racial identity exposes this broader inadequacy of equality
doctrine.38 Several scholars, however, have offered alternative paradigms that
recognize the expressive nature of identity and the relationship between speech
and equality. Nan Hunter, for example, has interrogated the concept of
"expressive identity" in her scholarship. 39 Hunter contests the essentialist
depictions of identity in juridical discourse, arguing that:
Expression is the crucible in which identity is formed. Identity
cannot exist subjectively without the constitutive impact of complex
discursive systems, one of which is expression. Discourses shape.
individual experiences of self-identification, in part by a process of
normalization that makes particular differences matter. Ideas shape
identity, and culture creates the self, at least as40much as the reverse.
Identity is not a prediscursive, biological given.
In the context of antiracism, several scholars have attempted to link black
political activism with the collective and individual identities of blacks. 4I
Furthermore, other scholars have examined the psychological, political, and
cultural benefits of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender self-identification.42

38.

Smith, supra note 1,at 555-58.

39.

See Nan Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissentfor Equality, 35 Harv.

C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 4-17 (2000).
40.
Id. at 9.
41.
See, e.g., Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1297 (1991)

(discussing how people of color utilize racial identity and "naming" as a "site of resistance");
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics,

and Reform, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1455, 1467 (2002) [hereinafter Hutchinson, ProgressiveRace
Blindness?] ("Political resistance is perhaps the most positive usage of race by persons of
color. Persons of color utilize racial identity to respond to racial subjugation. Race serves as
an organizational instrument for challenging racial oppression."); Chris K. Iijima, Race as
Resistance: Racial Identity as More than Ancestral Heritage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 497, 509

(1999) ("At least for Asian Pacific Americans, how we define ourselves is intimately tied to
the political purpose of our racial identity.").
42.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American PublicLaw, 106 Yale L.J.

2411, 2442 (1997) ("The closet diminishes not only the integrity of its denizens, but also their
mental health .... A wide variety of psychologists have found that.., the best-adjusted gay
individuals have gone through a process of 'acceptance and appreciation' of their sexual
identity."); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender-
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Judicial discussions of identity, however, ordinarily fail to take these
connections among speech, identity, and equality into account.
While Smith's article focuses mainly on the retaliatory provisions of
Title VII and less on the substantive racial discrimination provisions of the
statute, his work nevertheless implicates the speech and identity relationship. As
Smith argues, the balancing test that some courts apply in Section 704 litigation
fails to appreciate the ways in which speech, and in particular racial protest
speech, helps to construct and sustain racial identity.43 Smith offers a
compelling assessment of medical and other scientific literature to support his
claim that courts must assess the reasonableness of the racial protest speech
with an understanding of blacks' experiences as perpetual victims of subtle
discrimination, and to provide an alternative approach that recognizes the
intersection of speech and identity. 44 Smith's analysis, however, could benefit
from an exploration of courts' general difficulty integrating expression and
identity and from an interrogation of the literature responding to this narrow
jurisprudence. While Section 704 provides a mechanism for a more integrated
discussion of speech and equality, by penalizing employer retaliation against
antiracist speech, doctrinal application of the anti-retaliation provisions have
limited the progressive uses of the statute.
III. THE "FACTLESS" COURT
Another difficulty that Professor Smith struggles against is the problem
of "subtle discrimination." The implementation of formal equality provisions in
antidiscrimination law has served both to advance and to hinder the goals of
equality. While formal equality has undoubtedly diminished the level of
inequality experienced by many members of oppressed classes,

45

the prohibition

of racial and sex discrimination has not completely eradicated unequal
treatment. Paradoxically, the attainment of formal racial equality has made it
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511,
596-97 (1992) (discussing the mental health costs of gay people concealing their sexual
identity); Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation:A Lawyer's Guide to Social
Science Research, 1 Law & Sexuality 133, 145-46 (1991) (arguing that "lesbians and gay
men probably maintain self esteem most effectively when they identify with and are
integrated into the larger lesbian and gay community").
43.
Smith, supra note 1, at 571-72.
44.
Id at 545-52, 565-66.
45.
See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1378
(1988) ("Removal of... public manifestations of [racial] subordination was a significant gain
for all Blacks, although some benefited more than others.").
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more difficult for victims of discrimination to litigate equality claims. In a
society that disparages overt manifestations of racism, racist actors often mask
their racist intent, making it hard for victims of racism to prove unlawful
discrimination.46 In a classic article, Charles Lawrence traces the problem of
subtle or unconscious racism to theories of modem psychology. 47 The human
mind reduces racist perceptions to the level of subconsciousness in order to
48
avoid a conflict with prevailing social norms that disparage overt racism.

Barbara Flagg powerfully extends Lawrence's analysis in her work on the
"transparency" of whiteness, to which she attributes much of the subtle
discrimination in contemporary American society. 49 Finally, David Benjamin
Oppenheimer has examined a battery of social science data that demonstrate the
pervasive embrace of racialized and gendered stereotypes by whites and
males. 50
As Smith's work illustrates, courts have often failed to contextualize
their analyses of claims of discrimination within this historical, psychological,
and social science framework that informs the work of Lawrence, Flagg,
Oppenheimer, and other scholars. Instead, courts have engaged in a
decontextualized analysis that treats pervasive patterns of racial and gender
discrimination as neutral and legitimate. The dismissal of impact evidence
occurs almost routinely in the context of equal protection claims,5 while courts

46.

See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know

How Legal Standards Work?, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1151, 1169 (1991) ("Where discrimination
is illegal or socially disapproved, social scientists predict that it will be practiced only when it
is possible to do so covertly and indirectly."); Reva Siegel, Why Equal ProtectionNo Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1135
(1997) (arguing that the Court has "defined discriminatory purpose in terms that are
extraordinarily difficult to prove in the constitutional culture its modem equal protection
opinions have created-a culture that now embraces 'equal opportunity' and
nondiscrimination' as a form of civic religion").
47.
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).

48.
49.

See id. at 331-36 (discussing psychoanalytic approach to racism).
Flagg, supranote 8, at 957.

50.

See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, UnderstandingAffirmative Action, 23 Hastings

Const. L.Q. 921, 946-58 (1996).
51.
See, e.g, Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1065, 1144-61
(1998) (criticizing the Court's dismissal of discriminatory impact statistics in equal protection
litigation); Damon J. Keith, What Happens to a Dream Deferred: An Assessment of Civil
Rights Law Twenty Years After the 1963 March on Washington, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
469, 476 (1984) (arguing that "the Court has imposed on the aggrieved party an almost
insurmountable burden of proving discriminatory intent"); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v.
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1405
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continue to apply, at least in theory, impact models in the Title VII setting.
Judicial blindness to facts of history and sociology not only influences the
standard case that seeks to prove discrimination by relying, at least in part, upon
evidence of discriminatory impact, but it can also impact enforcement of
Section 704. As Professor Smith argues, persons of color often engage in "selfhelp" measures to counter racism, rather than taking the uncertain and costly
task of litigating perceived incidents of racism. 52 If these employees suffer
retaliation for their antiracist speech, existing jurisprudence may not afford
them a remedy under Title VII due precisely to courts' inability to reckon with
subtle discrimination.
The judicial unwillingness to recognize unconscious bias affects the
Section 704 litigant in two ways. First, courts may not appreciate the level of
unconscious bias or everyday indignities that persons of color endure routinely
in the workplace, and will therefore question or remain skeptical of the
plaintiffs perceived need for protest. If courts are unable to comprehend the
pervasive nature of subtle discrimination, then they will likely not find that the
plaintiff had a good faith basis for engaging in racial protest. A second way in
which judicial ignorance of subtle discrimination can impact a Section 704
plaintiff lies in the doctrinal requirement that the plaintiff's protest-even if
based on a good faith belief that the employer is violating Title VII--occurred
in a "reasonable" (or nondisruptive) fashion. If courts do not fully comprehend
the psychological harms that subtle racism engenders, then they will not
appreciate the sometimes colorful or dramatic nature of a plaintiff's reaction to
acts of discrimination. Under a decontextualized analysis, courts evaluating the
disruptive nature of antiracist and feminist
protest have portrayed "minority and
53
female complainants as sociopaths."
Professor Smith urges courts to abandon their decontextualized discussion of discrimination in favor of the approaches advocated by antisubordination and civil rights theorists like Lawrence, Flagg, and Oppenheimer. 54 Yet, Smith could strengthen his own analysis by demonstrating more
generally how courts-within and outside of Title VII litigation-weaken
(1988) (arguing that the discriminatory intent rule requires plaintiffs in racial discrimination
cases to prove "that officials were 'out to get' a person or group on account of race"); Donald
E. Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of IntegratedSchools: Modern Problems in a
Post-DesegregationSociety, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 117, 136 (1987) ("Because a discriminatory

intent standard has led to insurmountable barriers against equal protection relief, and does not
even measure unconscious motivation, a new test for calibrating the appropriate level of
judicial review may be indispensable for security against modem wrongs.").
52.
Smith, supra note 1, at 530, 533-34.

53.
54.

Id.
at 561.
Id.
at 536-40.
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antidiscrimination law by rejecting a contextualized or fact-based approach to
civil rights adjudication. 55 A more comprehensive analysis of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence demonstrates that the judicial rejection of context and facts exists
as a structural problem in contemporary equality doctrine.
In equal protection litigation, for example, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly legitimated laws that, though facially neutral, cause pervasive, often
anticipated, patterns of discrimination against historically oppressed classes.
The Court, however, has dismissed plaintiffs' efforts to contextualize these
discriminatory patterns within a long history of racial and gender domination.
Instead, the Court has treated these patterns as presumptively constitutional and
has discredited even the most sophisticated statistical, historical, and
sociological analyses that seek to unveil the racist and patriarchal roots of
"neutral" statutes. In McCleskey v. Kemp,56 for instance, the Supreme Court
rejected an equal protection challenge to the Georgia death penalty.57 The
petitioner relied upon a study that controlled for over 230 non-racial variables to
isolate race as a substantial factor in the administration of the state's death
penalty, 58 and he pointed to the long history of racial discrimination in the
context of Georgia criminal procedure. 59 The Court, however, ignored this
factual context and dismissed the study as presenting a mere "discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race." 60 Furthermore, in a blatant marginalization of
the continued importance of the legacy of racial domination, the Court relegates
its "discussion" of the relevance of Georgia's history of brutal racial
discrimination in the context of criminal law to a mere footnote and summarily
rejects petitioner's attempt to invoke this history as a context for understanding
his claim of racial discrimination. The court acknowledges that:
McCleskey relies on "historical evidence" to support his claim of
purposeful discrimination by the State. This evidence focuses on
Georgia laws in force during and just after the Civil War. Of course,
the "historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source"
for proof of intentional discrimination. But unless historical evidence
is reasonably contemporaneous with the challenged decision, it has
little probative value. Although the history of racial discrimination in

55.

See, e.g., Resnik, supra note *,at 623-24.

56.

481 U.S. 279 (1987).

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
at 291-92.
Id.
at 287.
Id. at 298 n.20.
Id. at 312.
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this country is undeniable, we cannot61 accept official actions taken
long ago as evidence of current intent.
The Court's sterile analysis vividly demonstrates the extent to which
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence engages in an ahistorical treatment
of racial subordination. The ancient and ongoing legacy of racial discrimination
in criminal procedure adds a reasonable context to McCleskey's claim of
discrimination.62 In the absence of this history, the contemporary patterns
indeed might indicate a "mere discrepancy" and McCleskey's proof might lack
social significance.63
While the MeCleskey decision suggests that more recent histories of
discrimination might bolster impact evidence in equal protection litigation,
precedent in this area paints a dramatically different picture. The Court has
applied its stringent discriminatory intent rule even in the face of more recent
"overt" discrimination against subjugated classes. In Washington v. Davis,64 for
example, the Court first began to require discriminatory intent in equal
protection cases; 65 yet, the Davis decision, which involved a challenge to an
employment practice that caused a racially discriminatory effect, was issued
only twelve years after the codification of Title VII. The next year, in Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,66 the Court would

61.
Id. at 298 n.20.
62.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding imprisonment of
Japanese Americans during World War 11based on race alone); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) (reversing conviction of black males accused of raping white women where
defendants convicted and received death penalty after one day trial, with all-white jury, and
without assistance of counsel); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating
criminal ordinance that was enforced in a strikingly racist fashion to the detriment of Chinese
Americans and to the advantage of whites); see also Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual:
The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 75 (1973) (observing that 405 of 455 men
executed in the United States for rape were black); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F.
Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy ": The Legitimization of RacialPowerlessness Through
the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 969, 984 (1992)

("Characterizing the judiciary's treatment of slaves and free blacks as a 'system of justice' is
almost a semantic illusion. Free whites were guaranteed an elaborate system of procedural
rights and protections, but blacks suffered under an equally elaborate regime of injustice and
harsh penalties.").
63.
I extensively address the matter of decontextualized equal protection jurisprudence,
including the McCleskey decision, in a forthcoming article. See Hutchinson, supra note 7.
64.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65.
Id. at 248.
66.
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that municipal zoning decision that had racially
disparate effects did not violate equal protection).

2003]

FA CTLESS JURISPRUDENCE

dismiss as nonprobative impact data in a housing segregation case that was
decided just eight years after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act.67 Title VII
and the Fair Housing Act, however, were enacted in a time of overt and
pervasive anti-black discrimination. 68 Furthermore, the passage of civil rights
statutes indicates an ongoing need to address discrimination against vulnerable
classes. 69 Yet, in Davis and Arlington, the Court found this social setting
irrelevant. Thus, even in cases where overt racial discrimination has existed
contemporaneously with a plaintiffs claim, the Court has applied an inflexible
and decontextualized approach that denies equal protection of the laws.
In addition to dismissing the evidentiary efforts of individual litigants
to prove discrimination, the Court has challenged governmental proof in this
context as well. For example, in United States v. Morrison,70 the Court
invalidated a statutory right of action created by the Violence Against Women
Act 71 on the grounds that it did not pertain to interstate commerce or correct a
gendered defect in state legislative processes.72 Congress, however, compiled
exhaustive research on the connections among private gendered violence,
interstate commerce, and equality.73 Moreover, in the affirmative action cases,
courts have challenged the fact-finding of Congress and state governments (and
their subdivisions) in order to overrule governmental arguments supporting
remedial uses of race.74 The Court has engaged in a decontextualized analysis of
governmental evidence of discrimination and has treated all forms of race
consciousness-whether remedial or invidious-as presumptively unconstitu-

67.
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
68.
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 47, at 366-69 (discussing history of invidious
housing discrimination with respect to the Arlington Heights case).
69.
See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("It is natural that evolving standards of
equality come to be embodied in legislation.").
70.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
71.
The invalidated section was contained at 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2000).
72.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 625-26.
73.
Id. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing evidence that Congress considered
before implementing the Violence Against Women Act); id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(same).
74.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that
congressional contracting affirmative action plan should be subjected to "strict scrutiny");
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that municipal
contracting affirmative action plan violated Equal Protection Clause); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that state medical school
affirmative action policy violated Equal Protection Clause).
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tional.75 Accordingly, the inability of courts to recognize the subtleties of
discrimination does not affect Title VII litigation alone; instead, courts have
exhibited a pervasive intolerance of historical and sociological inquiries in the
equality context. Professor Smith can fortify his claim that courts render Title
VII inadequate by canvassing these additional juridical areas. These cases
suggest, however, that Smith's endeavor to push courts toward a more
contextualized equality
doctrine may face much more resistance than his
76
analysis concedes.
IV. RACIAL REALISM: THE LIMITATIONS OF LAW AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE

A final, less substantial, point I wish to make regarding Smith's
analysis centers around the implications of critical legal insights, particularly
the legal indeterminacy theory, upon his arguments. For most of his article,
Smith takes a highly critical stance toward the judicial treatment of plaintiffs in
the Title VII context; he bolsters his arguments using liberal and
deconstructionist arguments. Yet, Smith concludes his work in modernist
fashion by offering a jurisprudential model that he believes will help move law
beyond the structural barriers his critical analysis uncovers. Even if courts were
to embrace Smith's contextual model, it is possible that the results he desires
may not materialize in each case. As critical legal scholars have argued, legal
analysis is indeterminate; it is malleable and cannot secure a fixed set of
outcomes (even in cases involving closely parallel facts)."

Thus, it remains

unclear whether courts will place sufficient emphasis on historical and
contemporary realities of racism even if they apply Smith's contextualized
approach, or whether white normative or assimilationist perspectives will remutate into new "neutral" perspectives in an analysis that attempts to push
courts beyond the present transparently white discourse. 78 I am particularly
concerned that in assessing the "disruptive" nature of a plaintiff's response to

75.
See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive
Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 113 (2000)
(arguing that the Court's remedial race redistricting opinions "suggest a new and troubling
conception of equal protection, one that appears to be unable to take account of the different
ways and contexts in which government may seek to use race, particularly in order to combat

discrimination").
76.
Smith, supra note 1, at 558.
77.
See Hasnas, supra note 9, at 86-90.
78.
See supra note 8 (discussing the oppressive nature of "neutral" laws).
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racism, courts will act upon racial biases that construct persons of color as
menacing, threatening, and criminal.79
Ironically, Smith discusses Derrick Bell's article recounting the racial
discrimination he faced as a professor at Harvard Law School; Smith argues
that while Bell could protest racism behind the safety of tenure (which he
ultimately relinquished), poor workers only have Section 704 to protect them
from unlawful white supremacist retaliation to their antiracist speech. 80 Even
the privileged Bell, however, remains highly skeptical toward the ability of law
to provide meaningful social change. In an essay entitled Racial Realism,81 Bell
argues that American law and society will never transcend their racist roots, 82
thus demonstrating his view of racial subordination as a permanent feature of
American existence. 8 3 Moreover, critical scholars in varying degrees and in a
diversity of intellectual contexts have questioned the utility of law as a vehicle
for social change.84 Notwithstanding the insightful nature of these critiques, for
several reasons I do not believe that Smith wastes his analysis on legal
institutions.
First, as Critical Race theorists have demonstrated, legal analysis can
simultaneously embrace both an intense skepticism toward law and legal
reasoning while relying upon legal structures as an avenue for progressive
change.85 Critical Race theorists first addressed the "duality" of progressive race
theory in response to the Critical Legal Studies movement's assault on rightsbased approaches to equality. 86 Informed by poststructuralist and neo-Marxist
79.
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1611, 1616-51 (1985) (discussing studies demonstrating constructs of blacks as menacing and
violent).
80.

Smith, supra note 1, at 573-74.

81.

See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363 (1992).

82.
See id.at 373 ("Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of
progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that
maintain white dominance.").
83.
See id.at 377 ("It is time we concede that a commitment to racial equality merely
perpetuates our disempowerment. Rather, we need a mechanism to make life bearable in a
society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class.") (footnote omitted).
84.
See Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 24, at 132-33 & nn. 150-218 (discussing
critical stances by various scholars towards law as an instrument of social change).
85.
Patricia J. Williams, AlchemicalNotes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 430 (1987) (discussing the simultaneous embrace and
skepticism of rights by blacks).
86.
See Minority Critiques of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 297 (1987) (presenting several works by Critical Race theorists opposing the radical
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thought, Critical Legal theorists deconstructed rights: they viewed them as
indeterminate, as causing false consciousness among and offering artificial hope
to oppressed people, as declawing progressive activism, and as alienating
members of the populace from one another.8 While Critical Race theorists
share the disenchantment of Critical Legal Studies with rights jurisprudence,
they also recognize the important historical and social role that rights
approaches have played in the liberation of persons of color. In a series of
essays, Critical Race theorists argue that while rights are malleable and
indeterminate, they have elevated the psyche and economic and social status of
persons of color; rights therefore provide a concrete, if imperfect, remedy for
social subordination.88 Thus, while an internal tension exists among the critical
and modernist strands of Critical Race Theory, race theorists have resigned to
"occupy that very tension., 89 Smith's work models the dual nature of Critical
Race Theory. While he takes a critical and deconstructive stance toward legal
analysis, he ultimately wishes to refashion legal analysis to make it more
responsive to the needs of oppressed persons, rather than abandoning the project
of law entirely.
Finally, even as I raise the indeterminacy thesis as a factor to consider
in critical legal analysis, I do not wholly embrace this form of analysis as a
legitimate critique. First, as the Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Studies
contestation over rights approaches demonstrates, oppressed people have
benefited historically from a rights approach. Critical scholarship such as
Smith's. seeks to reinvigorate antidiscrimination law that suffers greatly under
the inflexible and sterile approaches of conservative jurists. Furthermore, the
indeterminacy critics fail to offer a tangible alternative to legal analysis. While
the law might remain a complicated venue for pursuing remedies to social
inequality, critics who wish to discard law altogether have neglected to explain
how other disciplines offer more concrete results or why progressive scholars
and activists should not pursue legal strategies concurrently with efforts in the
political sector. The task for critical scholars, therefore, does not consist of
advocating a wholesale abandonment of law and other modernist structures;
instead, their status as progressives might require these scholars to revisit and
directly engage modernist structures, blending critical and reconstructive

deconstruction of rights by Critical Legal scholars).
87.
See Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?, supra note 41, at 1476 (discussing
Critical Legal Studies skepticism towards rights).
88.

See supra note 8.

89.
See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 741,
762 (1994) (arguing that Critical Race theorists must "live in the conflict between modernism
and postmodernism").
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approaches. 90 Professor Smith's work makes these important integrative efforts.
On the one hand, Smith uncovers the white, transparent, and oppressive nature
of existing Title VII jurisprudence, but he also offers a concrete jurisprudential
model for addressing the problems of subtle discrimination and the linkages
between expression and identity. Smith's work provides a complicated and
critical, yet appropriate, response to the factless and decontextualized nature of
contemporary equality doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Smith's article offers a compelling alternative to the factless
state of contemporary equality jurisprudence. His model of equality, which
links speech, identity, and well-being, can serve as a guide for reforming not
only Title VII jurisprudence, but also doctrinal approaches to equality in the
constitutional setting. While Smith's essay could benefit from a more thorough
interrogation of the insights of critical legal scholarship, particularly Critical
Race Theory, his essay undoubtedly makes an important contribution to
ongoing efforts to reform equality doctrine.

90.

See, e.g., id.

